Lately, in developing countries, there have been a tendency of instituting a constituency development fund giving the upper hand to the lawmaker to choose projects at the community level of their preference. Constituency Infrastructure Development Fund is funding arrangements that channel money from the central or provincial government directly to electoral constituencies[i] for local infrastructure projects. In Nepal, the program of similar nature was initiated first by the name of the Local Development Programme at the local level with a grant of Rs. 300,000 for the Village Development Committee by late Finance Minister Bharat Mohan Adhikari in 1994 with the intention of pleasing the members of parliament, which was later continued by finance minister Ram Sharan Mahat by providing a new grant for Member of Parliament as a Constituency Development Grant of Rs. 400,000 each at a time when there was no elected body in the country. It is not only continued to date but also extended to the Provincial government as well. Currently, the fund is mobilized under the partnership program.
Nepal started distributing such funds in two different names Constituency Infrastructure Special Programme and Constituency Development Programmes. A constituency Infrastructure Special program and Constituency Development Programme are a particular type of local development program in which the Member of Parliament identifies community needs of his/her constituency and control fund’s disbursement. Instead of giving continuity to the two programs of the same nature, it was amalgamated into one as a partnership program from the fiscal year 2076/77. Because of it’s distribute character, it is also called pork barrel. Such a practice was first initiated in the Philippines, India and Pakistan and imitated as many as 23 countries by 2009[ii]. Other country in South Asia to follow the suit is Bhutan. The other countries are Ghana, Honduras, Jamaica, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mongolia, Namibia, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Rwanda, Solomon Islands, Southern Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe[iii].
Members of Parliament in Nepal have always channeled down resources to party workers, voters and other supporters in their constituencies. Critics of this practice insist that MPs instead need to concentrate on national legislation in parliament and leave local issues to the local governments. But most MPs continue the old practice and in fact continue to receive a government grant which is to be used precisely for purposes in their own constituencies.[iv]
Despite criticism from various quarters, the government has allocated a budget of Rs 60 million to each lawmaker in the House of Representatives elected under the First Past the Post (FPTP) system, for the development of their respective constituencies. The total budget apportioned for the purpose is Rs 9.9 billion. The total budget combining provisions to federal and provincial lawmakers stands at 21 billion in the year 2076/77. It has also created dissatisfaction of and recrimination for the biased treatment between the lawmakers of the House of Representatives and the National Assembly as well as the members elected through the proportional representation system, since the fund is arranged for 165 lawmakers elected under the first-past-the-post system, leaving 110 out of the arrangement.
Because of its rampant misuse, as indicated in its report of the auditor general, it has come into controversy over and over again. The Member of Parliament may give several justification of its usefulness, but the truth is that after the formation of local government such a justification has lost its eminence and validity limiting the lawmakers to concentrate on the legislative functions only. However, The budget under the program can be used only in development activities and not in social activities, a mechanism formed to oversee the program led by directly elected lawmaker which includes those elected under the proportional representation system to select development projects involving federal lawmaker into community-level development may invite friction and controversy between the local government and central government.
The constituency infrastructure development program, however, is devised to address the requirements at the community level with smaller projects, which were unable to be included in the national-level program, contradicts not only with the principle of decentralization but also with the democratic ideals. The following reasons explained hereafter say why this type of fund is against democratic values.
Conflict of interests: The local government may have different development priorities than the projects selected by the Member of Parliament, which often is driven by political interest. There is a higher chance that instead of building irrigation canals, spouts for drinking water or smaller projects alike such funds are possibly used for gaining electoral favor by seeking support from local clubs, religious or cultural trusts, etc. through the investment in building temples, monasteries or supplying sport utilities.
Against Separation of power: It undermines the authority of local government and goes against the spirit of federalism. In a democratic government, MPs have the responsibility of drafting the law while the executive branch is tasked with implementing it. Allowing MPs direct control over development funds, in effect, changes their function within government from a legislative to an executive one. Having the power to both draft and implement laws tips the power of balance disproportionately towards the legislative branch of government.
Distribute character: Once it is introduced, it is politically difficult to reduce its size. Contrarily, there remains persistent pressure from the Member of Parliament to increase the volume of such funds. Since the projects should be initiated with a small grant selected at the community level by the lawmaker, it would have a minuscule effect in the national development goal. The scarce national resources will be scattered for petty projects. With the budget of Rs. 21 billion allocated under this fund, a megaproject could have been completed that is capable of generating a significant impact in the national economy.
Chances of misuse of funds because of weak monitoring mechanisms: Because of the weak monitoring mechanisms, there are chances of misuse of funds. The regulation has also allowed lawmakers to implement the projects through the consumer committees without competition. As per Public Procurement Law, projects having cost up to Rs10 million can be implemented through the consumer committees without a competitive tendering process, which allows the lawmaker to award the contract to his/her favorite. Most of the projects under this program has drawn controversy for its weak monitoring and implementation. The report published by the auditor general has also raised questions of its utility, usefulness and rationality.
Diverts lawmaker from their core responsibilities: According to Albert van Zyl, there are four fundamental reasons to prove wrong of the constituency development funds- it breaches the principle of separation of power, reduces the government capacity, and weakens the oversight capacity of the legislature. Constituency Development Programme is less aligned with local development priorities than other local infrastructure projects. Project selection are used to influence the result of the elections. In the run-up elections where ruling party may misuse the resources to ensure victory. The competing other candidate will find in disadvantaged position to seek favors of the voters, while the incumbent MPs enjoy the fund through commitment to local projects, investment to local youth clubs and cultural trusts. It was evident during the elections that MPs were selective on funds expenditure while approaching the elections.